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Abstract
This essay focuses on the developments that are most important for the current and future
roles of the United Nations post Cold War. The U.N.’s involvement in the ending of the colonial
system and in providing help to Third World economies establishes the basis for the present-day
assumption that it is the responsibility of the world organization to shore up societies that collapse,
or threaten to collapse, into disorder.

ESSAYS
THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE COLD WAR:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE POST-COLD
WAR SITUATION
Inis L. Claude,Jr.*
The transient euphoria induced by the ending of the Cold
War rested in part on a view that we might call the "Rip Van
Winkle," or perhaps the "Sleeping Beauty," theory of the United
Nations. This was the notion that the world organization had
been dormant throughout the period of the Cold War but had
now awakened and could, at long last, become the kind of organization described in its Charter and begin to function as its
founders had intended in 1945. This line of thought incorporates fallacies about both the past and the future of the United
Nations. The United Nations of the 1990's is not free to function
in the manner contemplated by its creators; its activities will be
determined not by its founding fathers but by its operating sons
and daughters, and it will have to react to global conditions very
different from those of 1945. Moreover, its future character will
be profoundly influenced by what it had become by 1990. The
United Nations had been drastically and, for the most part, disadvantageously affected by the Cold War, but it is simply not true
that it had been reduced to inactivity. During those four decades, it had grown, changed, adapted, and developed in response to the needs, demands, opportunities, and circumstances
of the time. A great many things of significance happened during the Cold War in, through, and to the United Nations. I
should like to focus on the developments that are most important for the current and future roles of the world organization.
At the root of many of those developments lies the fact that
Nations became a prominent instrument of the antiUnited
the
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colonial movement, used to encourage, promote, and confer legitimacy upon decolonization. The success of that movement,
manifested in the rapid and near-total replacement of colonies
by newly independent states, reflected the failure of the ideal of
trusteeship that had figured in both the Covenant of the League
of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations. Trusteeship
purported to offer careful preparation for colonial emancipation, and it is one of the tragedies of twentieth-century international organization that such a scheme never really caught on,
gained the confidence of potential clients, or produced the
promised results. For better or for worse, the colonial peoples
rejected gradualism in favor of Freedom Now, and the United
Nations became a party to the creation of the so-called Third
World of new states. Unfortunately, many of these entities were
ill-prepared for independence, and their emergence accounts in
considerable degree for the plethora of failed and uncertainly
viable states that contribute so heavily to the global disorder of
our time. The United Nations, having had some responsibility
for the creation of these states, bears some responsibility for rescuing them from the chaos into which they all too frequently
fall.
A direct consequence of decolonization was the entry into
the United Nations of virtually all the new states, which gradually
brought about the Third World's political control and ideological domination of the General Assembly and, through the Assembly, of many of the processes and programs of other organs.
Naturally enough, this new majority formulated an agenda featuring the needs, values, and demands of its members, so that
economic assistance and measures for promoting the economic
development of Third World states became increasingly prominent parts of the U.N.'s activity. In some sense, the United Nations became an agency of post-independence trusteeship, as
erstwhile colonial peoples, having refused to delay independence for preparation, sought post facto assistance in achieving
the capacity for successful statehood. The U.N.'s involvement in
the ending of the colonial system and in providing help to Third
World economies establishes the basis for the present-day assumption that it is the responsibility of the world organization to
shore up societies that collapse, or threaten to collapse, into disorder.
The United Nations of the period under discussion also be-
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came an agent -

indeed, the world's chief agent -

of the con-

ferment and the denial of collective legitimacy. Its organs, and
particularly the General Assembly, came to be regarded as authoritative articulators of the community will, as sources of politically valuable pronouncements of multilateral approval and disapproval. Exploiting this development, member states avidly
sought the blessing of the United Nations for themselves and
invoked its curse upon their antagonists. Collective legitimization became a major function of the organization, in part because of the usual unwillingness and incapacity of the U.N.'s
members to take strong and decisive action. The Cold War and
deeply entrenched national dispositions to shy away from risky
enforcement actions reduced collective security to collective
delegitimization; aggressors were typically confronted not with
multilateral resistance but with multilateral condemnation. The
emergence of the collective legitimization function was also promoted by the decolonization movement, which found significant
value in U.N. denunciation of colonialism and endorsement of
efforts to overthrow it. As the Third World emerged, it used its
growing voting power to make the United Nations its ideological
ally, exploiting the organization's global acoustics to proclaim
support for the myriad complaints and demands of new states.
This development of the Cold War period is the major source of
today's multilateralist emphasis, with its bias against naked unilateralism and its urge to seek the cover of U.N. authorization. It
also contributes to the prevailing tendency to rely on declaratory, symbolic, tongue-lashing, wrist-slapping action as a pretense
of but actual substitute for serious response to nasty situations.
The fruit of collective legitimization is all too often the substitution of posturing for genuine confrontation of issues.
Today's international agenda is shaped by the New Interventionism: the tendency to attribute to the United Nations
and perhaps to states able to secure the approval or to avoid
the disapproval of the United Nations - the authority and even
the obligation to intervene in domestic situations that appear
dangerous or offensive to the outside world. The roots of this
tendency can be found not only in the United Nations of the
Cold War era but also in the League of Nations. The constitutional documents of both the League and the United Nations
provided for the exemption of the domestic jurisdiction of states
from the purview of international bodies. As early as 1923, how-

792

FORDHAMINTERWATIONALLAWJOURWAL

[Vol. 18:789

ever, the Permanent Court of International Justice, in the Advisory Opinion concerning the Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco,' held that the fence dividing the fields of domestic and international jurisdiction was a movable one, subject
to shifts brought about by the making of treaties. This acknowledgement that matters substantively domestic in nature may be,
or may become, legally international concerns prefigured major
changes in jurisdictional views in the period of the U.N.'s development. The Charter provided a license for international reaction to human rights abuses within states, and the United Nations has been persistently injected into domestic situations
thought to have serious international repercussions. Increasingly, the United Nations has been used to proclaim standards of
appropriate behavior for governments within their own territories, and to sponsor or approve interference when voting majorities become sufficiently indignant about violations. Campaigns
waged in the United Nations against colonialism, apartheid and
other manifestations of racism, and gross violations of human
rights might be interpreted as having the effect not merely of
shifting the jurisdictional fence but of dismantling it. Debate in
the United Nations about domestic jurisdiction is today almost as
pass6 as debate in the United States about states' rights; while
the wisdom or feasibility of U.N. intervention in particular cases
may be questioned, the organization's authority to intervene is
seldorri seriously at issue. If the United Nations is now the victim
of excessive expectations and over-burdening, the fault lies
partly in this erosion of limitations on its jurisdiction.
Finally, let me note the invention of peacekeeping, a U.N.
political function unknown to the Charter. Its real beginning
was the improvisation of the United Nations Emergency Force
("UNEF I") to help the parties disentangle themselves from the
Suez fiasco in 1956,2 and it was given definition and theoretical
elaboration by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in 1960.1
1. Advisory Opinion No. 4, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4.
2. See Summay Study of the ExperienceDerivedfrm the Establishmentand Operationof the
Force: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Agenda Item 65(c), Annex,
at 8, U.N. Doc. A/3943 (1958) [hereinafer UNEF Summay Study] (discussing accomplishments of UNEF I).
3. See Introductionto the Annual Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. IA, U.N. Doc. A/4390/Add. 1 (1960) (stating
Hammarskjold's conception of peacekeeping).
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Peacekeeping entails the deployment in trouble spots, with consent of the parties, of military or, occasionally, civilian police
contingents contributed by acceptably neutral states and operating under U.N. command and control. Its mission is to help
those parties maintain a tenuous peace - not to fight, or to
prevent fighting, but to assist parties who realize assistance is required to avoid the degeneration of their relationships into violence. Peacekeeping is a neutralizing role that can be played
only by an agency and its agents in whose commitment to impartiality the parties have confidence. If the Cold War largely prevented the development of the political functions assigned to the
United Nations in its Charter, it inspired and facilitated the formulation of the peace-keeping function. In the post-Cold War
era, this notable political innovation has given rise to the
proliferation of U.N. missions of various kinds, undertaking diverse tasks. Unfortunately, a general tendency has developed to
label all such operations as peace-keeping missions, even though
many of them might more accurately be described as peace-making, peace-enforcing, humanitarian aid-giving, or even war-fighting operations. There is an urgent need for all concerned to
introduce honesty, clarity, and precision into the characterization of the functions assigned to U.N. operations, eschewing the
indiscriminate use of the peace-keeping euphemism. The confusing mixture of functions and labels in the current series of
U.N. operations stems ultimately from the relatively simple origins of peace-keeping in the midst of the Cold War.
This is not, of course, the complete story of the United Nations in the years of the Cold War, but enough has been said to
demonstrate that the world organization was by no means dormant during that period. One may evaluate some aspects of this
record positively, and others negatively, but one cannot deny
that it included developments that have a major impact on international relations today and on the present and future roles of
the United Nations.

